



QUESTIONING NOT THE EU, BUT THE “WESTERN SYSTEM”

European crises through the lens of Chinese media

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Main findings and conclusions:

- Chinese media reports convey general support of and hope for unity and stability in the European Union. The British vote to leave the EU has, however, disrupted many Chinese commentators' basic assumption of political continuity in Europe.
- Rather than blaming the EU as an institution, most Chinese party-state media portray the US as the main culprit of the various crises afflicting the EU. Europeans are seen as either victims or consenting followers. If the EU

is criticised, it is mostly for not acting more efficiently to address the refugee crisis and terrorism.

- Ahead of the 'Brexit' referendum, the Chinese press considered the rise of populist and right-wing extremist parties as a key threat to stability in Europe. The absence of any sympathy or support for European anti-establishment currents clearly sets Chinese media discourse apart from that of Russia, where European right-wing parties are actively instrumentalised to undermine political stability.
- Chinese media mainly refer to European crises as proof of the hypocrisy and decline of “universal” or “Western”


values and political concepts. In particular, the refugee crisis and the rise of right-wing parties are used to illustrate the pitfalls of democracy to the Chinese public.

- The party-state press in particular forge the weaknesses of Western policies into a fundamental, systematic critique of “the West”. Moreover, the official press uses the indictment of Western failures to point to the superiority of Chinese policies and political concepts, indicating an ultimate triumph of China over the “West” in this “competition of systems”.
- Analysis of market-oriented media and social media shows that this party line has not (yet) taken hold in Chinese society at large and is even challenged to some extent. Commentators for more independent media show more interest in Europe's internal discussions and the potential implications of the crises for European countries.
- By engaging directly and actively with influential market-oriented media and key opinion leaders in China, European countries can communicate an authentic and honest assessment of their failures and challenges to an interested Chinese audience.

Facts on the MERICS analysis: different Chinese media images of Europe's crises

- Based on Chinese-language **keyword search** for the respective crises, a total of about **75,000 articles** published between April 2015 and April 2016 by mainland Chinese media outlets were identified.
- To compare official and 'non-official' Chinese media discourse, articles were grouped into **three media categories**: party-state media, 'market-oriented' private media and social media, focusing on blog posts on some of the most popular web portals such as Sina Blog or Sohu Blog. The database was further extended to include immediate Chinese reactions after the British referendum on 23 June.
- The figure on the right gives an overview of the agenda-setting logics identified with regard to European topics: Whereas **official media** both reflect the official party line and can be viewed as authoritative information mainly for leadership circles, media classified as **'market-oriented'**, although subject to censorship and control, has to obey market imperatives and fulfil audience demands.
- **Social Media** presents a very pluralistic and diffuse picture. However, in a strictly controlled media environment like China's, analytical blogposts do provide selective yet important insights into voices from society which would otherwise not be heard.
- For both official and market-oriented media images, **international news agencies do play a major role**. In fact, a large part of the analysed media reports were mainly a compilation of diverse European and other international news stories (Russia TV, Al Jazeera, among others) and contained little if any explicitly Chinese analysis or viewpoints. This is why, for the **in-depth content analysis of 300 articles** (equally distributed across different media types and crises), we focused on opinion pieces that clearly expressed Chinese viewpoints.
- Due to limited space, only one most representative citation has been included for each main argument.

Agenda-setting on EU topics in Chinese media



1. Why Chinese views on European crises matter to Europe

In recent years, the European Union has become almost accustomed to the proliferation of systemic crises, ranging from the ongoing sovereign debt crisis and the divisions over how to deal with the arrival en masse of refugees to the rise of right-wing populism across the continent. **The British 'leave' vote on 23 June has further plunged the EU into a difficult process of internal soul-searching.** Looking beyond the internal dimension of these crises, European publics and decision-makers should also be keenly aware that the ongoing crises have a profound impact on Europe's international standing vis-à-vis powerful players like the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The PRC, the EU's second largest trading partner, has thus far expressed confidence in the EU's ability to deal with the crises afflicting it. In official statements, Chinese leaders have consistently promoted European unity against any possible disintegration. Nonetheless, Europe's internal problems are already affecting the EU-China relationship: In diplomatic encounters, **Chinese officials have started to systematically confront their European counterparts with European crises to forestall Europe's own criticism of economic problems and political repression in China.**

The change in Chinese media reporting on Europe in relation to current crises and in comparison to the previously quite positive Chinese outlook¹ is an important indicator for potential strategic shifts in China's policies towards Europe. **More specifically, it is crucial for Europe to understand whether Beijing views European crises mainly as endangering a constructive relationship with the region or as an opportunity to deal more easily with a weakened EU.**

This is all the more important in light of China's growing economic presence and more assertive pursuit of interests in Europe. Whereas Beijing officially continues to emphasise the 'absence of strategic conflicts' in EU-China relations, tensions

over issues like the granting of market economy status, Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, or the treatment of foreign NGOs and companies in China are on the rise. Soaring Chinese investment aimed at technological leapfrogging is equally stirring hot political debates in Germany and France.

To learn more about the Chinese view(s) on Europe's crises, we need to look beyond the official Chinese statements emphasising harmony and 'win-win cooperation'. This study provides a more comprehensive picture by analysing the coverage of five recent European crises (the Greek debt crisis, the refugee crisis, the rise of right-wing populism, terrorist attacks, and the Brexit referendum) in three different types of Chinese-language media (party-state media, market-oriented media, and social media forums), analysing some 75,000 articles in total.


2. China continues to support EU political stability

Most Chinese commentators not only supported, but also expected overall political continuity in Europe despite the various crises over the last year. Although roughly a third of all analysed opinion articles (34%) portrayed the crises as challenges to EU unity, most comments expressed confidence that political stability could be maintained despite the imminent threats of a 'Brexit' in 2016 or, likewise, a 'Grexit' in 2015:

*"Chinese experts believe that the possibility of a Brexit is rather small."*² (Global Times, 23/06/2016)

2.1 CHINESE COMMENTATORS' CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL CONTINUITY HAS BEEN DISRUPTED BY THE BREXIT VOTE

In addition to this erroneous confidence in the status quo, the potential systemic repercussions of Britain leaving the Euro-



pean Union have been largely neglected in party-state, market-orientated and social media. Only 22% of the articles on the Brexit debate *before* the actual referendum discussed its potential impact on EU stability, while only 15% mentioned any potential implications for China.

The “Brexit” vote has significantly disrupted this continuity bias in Chinese media. With the immediate negative consequences being felt in Chinese and European stock markets alike, reports and commentaries focused on the damaging effects to political and economic stability:

*“Brexit is the start of an EU split-up [...] it is also a signal of the interruption of the Globalization Era.”*³ (Shi Hanbing, Sohu Blog, 26/06/2016)

2.2 THE RISE OF RIGHT-WING PARTIES ACROSS EUROPE IS SEEN AS A KEY THREAT TO STABILITY


Reporting on the Brexit referendum reflects a more general preference in Chinese media for the political status quo in Europe. This may also explain why Chinese commentators express no sympathy or support for right-wing anti-establishment movements or their leaders trying to overturn the current political order.

This clearly sets Chinese media discourse apart from the media discourse in Russia, for instance, where the rise of anti-establishment parties in Europe is welcomed and actively instrumentalised in order to discredit mainstream political parties. Taking party-state media as a reflection of Chinese foreign policy interests, in the short run **Beijing seems unlikely to foster political instability or support ‘anti-establishment’ currents in Europe** – in clear contrast to Vladimir Putin’s Russia in recent years.⁴

The rise of populist and extremist parties is, however, clearly seen as a symptom of the systemic weakness of constitutional democracies that is attributed to the failure of respective national mainstream parties:

Brexit and the Greek economic crisis are discussed more neutrally in Chinese media

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive



*“The victory of the [Austrian right-wing] Freedom Party is the epitome of Europe’s current political state, [...] the people feel universally despairing and insecure and are dissatisfied with the ruling political parties of their respective countries.”*⁵ (Xinhua, 26/04/2016)

2.3 THE EU’S MAIN FAILURE IS ITS “LACK OF FORCE” IN FACE OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS AND TERRORISM

Overall, only a limited number of commentators attribute the respective crises to a failure of the EU itself. It is mostly individual nations that are the subjects of criticism. Where the EU as an institution is blamed, it is mostly its inability to take forceful decisions, often linked with its lack

of unity that is criticised:

*“EU Member States have different levels of development and different interests, conflicts are inevitable because they all fight for their own interests.”*⁶ (Zhang Fan, Beijing Daily, 14/10/2015)

Moreover, this is much more common with regard to the refugee crisis and the terrorism problem. Chinese media commonly link both the rise of right-wing extremism and the refugee crisis to Europe’s terrorism problem.⁷ **Related articles convey significantly more negative sentiments⁸ than those on Brexit and the Greek crisis.**

In fact, Brexit and the Greek crisis have largely been discussed from a rather neutral, economic perspective, presenting different views and weighing economic risks and opportunities. The other crises, by contrast, relate much more closely

to normative and cultural dimensions, raising questions of human dignity and social justice (refugee crisis), tolerance (terrorism), or the effectiveness of democratic systems (right-wing extremism). **While Chinese media do not call the EU itself into question, European crises do serve well as indicators of the flaws of “the West”.**

3. Chinese party-state media use European crises to discredit “the West”

The criticism of “Western values” or “Western democracy” has gained new momentum in China as part of president Xi Jinping’s ‘reideologisation’ campaign.⁹ In a political context, so-called “universal values” or “Western values” refer to individual human rights, as well as to principles of democratic governance like freedom of expression, political participation or an independent ‘civil society’.

3.1 EUROPEAN CRISES INDICATE THE WEAKNESSES OR FALSEHOOD OF “WESTERN” VALUES

Chinese media were quick to explain the outcome of the Brexit referendum as proof of the flaws of democratic governance. With regard to separatist tendencies in two of China’s provinces, the notion of a referendum is particularly sensitive and the political disruptions following the British vote thus play into the hands of the Chinese leadership.¹⁰

“The defects of making a national-level decision with an arbitrary referendum are obvious.”¹¹ (Xinhua News, 26/06/2016)

Party-state media’s interest in the refugee crisis in particular is more guided by a desire to highlight the hy-

pocrisy or weakness of “Western values” rather than genuine interest in the developments in Europe. To this end, the CCP media employ a fixed/unified codex of key words as a basis for communicating and shaping a coherent perception within Chinese society.

In a series of commentaries, the CCP’s People’s Daily portrays the European refugee crisis as proof of the decline or falsehood of the “Western system” or “Western values”:

“The refugee crisis is the result of a self-righteous idea of ‘democracy.’”¹² (Wu Sike, China’s former special envoy on mid-east, People’s Daily, 07/10/2015)

“From the phantom of human rights to the refugee crisis – hegemonies in international relations.”¹³ (Prof. He Liqun, Jilin University, People’s Daily, 11/04/2016)

“The West” is notably blamed for trying to impose its own ideas on Arab countries, making the refugee crisis the ‘just retribution’ for Europe:

“The refugee crises in Europe is the bitter fruit harvested from the colour revolution.”¹⁴ (Li Weijian, Dean of the Shanghai Foreign Policy Research Institute, People’s Daily, 04/10/2015)

3.2 THE US IS PORTRAYED AS THE MAIN CULPRIT OF THE CRISES, EUROPEANS AS FOLLOWERS OR VICTIMS

When Chinese commentators criticise “the West”, they are usually at least implicitly pointing to the US, with Europeans portrayed as either victims or consenting followers of cynical US policy. This is most evident in authoritative party-state media like People’s Daily or *Qiushi*:

“The United States as an instigator of the ‘Arab Spring’ is now reluctant to receive refugees from the Middle East, this shows


that their own interests are more important than their ‘universal values’.”¹⁵ (Zhang Weiwei, Fudan University, Qiushi, 15/02/2016)

Depending on the respective author’s viewpoint on refugees, the US is either made responsible for the tragedies that the refugees encounter or for the ‘Arab invasion’ that is said to undermine European culture. Terrorist attacks on the European continent are equally attributed to US interference in other countries and ‘democracy promotion’:

“The US and their European ‘sidekicks’ used the term ‘new humanitarian intervention’ as a pretext to force the democratic transformation in many MENA countries; the war on terror and the subsequent outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’ [...] produced the refugee crisis and ISIS.”¹⁶ (Bu Shaohua, CIIS, People’s Daily, 15/09/2015)

The refugee crisis, right-wing extremism and terrorism are portrayed as indictments of European values

Percentage of articles portraying crisis as proof of failure for European or Western values, by crisis



A unified codex of key words for a systemic critique of “the West”



Key concepts	Key-related verbs	Key-related nouns
“universal values” (普世价值) mostly used with quotation marks or with “so called” (所谓); Western values (西方价值); Western democracy (西方民主)	agitate (鼓吹), impose (强加), infiltrate (渗透), kidnap (绑架), “taking [key concept] as an excuse to...” (以。。。为借口)	hypocrisy (虚伪), cliché (偏见), hegemony (霸权主义), trap (陷阱), distress (困境), malpractice (渎职)

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3.3 CRISES ABROAD HELP CHINA TAKE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

While a mere 9% of Chinese official media articles on European crises discuss any direct implications for China, portraying these crises as an indictment of failure for “Western” systems and policies allows them to indirectly prove the superiority of Chinese policies and concepts:

*“The refugee crisis not only highlighted the paradox inherent in ‘universal values’, but also helps us understand the great significance of China adhering to the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics. If China had not insisted on resisting the so-called ‘universal values’, the consequences could have been disastrous.”*¹⁷ (Zhang Weiwei, Fudan University, Qishi, 15/02/2016)

Highlighting European crises as signs of Western decline also serves another purpose that fits well with a broader party-state agenda. **It strengthens the call for a bolder or more assertive China, promoting “Chinese” concepts as an alternative to Western ones:**

*“China should be bolder in the international arena, for example by actively pointing out the root causes of the refugee crisis and exposing the problems of the West. [...] China could be the ‘Man of virtue and wisdom’ (仁者) for the establishment of a new world order.”*¹⁸ (Bu Shaohua, CIIS, People’s Daily, 15/09/2015)

The above interpretation of European crises in party-state media and by senior Chinese experts in international affairs should not, however, be mistaken for *‘the Chinese view’* on Europe. **It is in fact crucial for Europeans to understand that in market-oriented media and many social media blogs, dissenting voices and goodwill for Europe persist.**

4. Party-state communication strategy regarding European crises has not (yet) taken hold in Chinese society

The causal attribution of the refugee and extremism crises to a general failure of “Western” political systems and “democracy promotion” abroad is predominantly found in party-state media – as well as in articles in other media which directly quote or paraphrase articles from these official sources. The concerted effort by authoritative Chinese media to use European crises to question “Western values” is only partially taking hold in the broader Chinese media discourse.

4.1 MARKET-ORIENTED MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA RARELY FOLLOW THE SYSTEMATIC CRITICISM OF THE “WEST” ORCHESTRATED BY PARTY-STATE MEDIA

The difference is most evident in relation to the refugee crisis, where market-oriented media focus much less on the alleged reasons behind the surge in refugee numbers, and more on the actual or potential effects of the crisis for Europe. They are thus much closer to the European media discourse, with a similar split between security concerns over the arrival of mainly Muslim refugees and reports showing sympathy for refugees or emphasising their potential benefit for Europe’s economy:


*“Arab and North African men on the bus offend women without any warning [...]. Reportedly, pepper spray is already sold out in Germany, as are guns in Austria.”*¹⁹ (Wang Jing, Caixin Weekly, 18/01/2016)

Market-oriented and social media reports on crisis scenarios



(Revised on July 14, 2016)

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive



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*"Many of the Syrian refugees had very respectable jobs in their own country: rich merchants, lawyers, teachers, university students..."*²⁰ (Southern Weekly, "The dangerous road into exile", 04/01/2016)

*"Refugees must not pay the bill for terrorist attacks."*²¹ (Caixin headline, 14/11/2015)

Social media is yet another case: From a quantitative angle, negative and even vulgar assessments prevail, especially regarding the refugee crisis. **The broad diffusion of negative stereotypes regarding the 'influx' of Muslim refugees into Europe is similar to that found on European social media platforms.** Both social media and market-oriented media display more interest in Europe's internal discussions and the potential implications of the crises than the CCP press. As they criticise, for example, the flawed 'rescue' policy and also do not shy away from negative scenarios, the sentiment displayed in their articles is more negative compared to party-state media sources, which stress political continuity (counted as a "positive" sentiment).

However, when looking into the more in-depth analytical articles on prominent blogs, there are also very different voices. **In direct opposition to the official narrative using the refugee crisis as proof of the superiority of the Chinese system, several public intellectuals express their sympathy for "Western values":**

*"The fact that the refugees fled from the Middle East to more democratic countries rather than to other authoritarian countries, shows that the refugees look forward to good living provided by a mature democratic society"*²² (Cao Xishun, 21ccom.net, 11/09/2015)

4.2 COMMENTATORS IN MARKET-ORIENTED AND SOCIAL MEDIA USE EUROPEAN CRISES AS A PROXY TO CRITICALLY REVIEW THE SITUATION IN CHINA

Whereas the main narrative in party-state media highlights a fundamental criticism of the 'Western system', a number of less nationalistic **Chinese commentators use European crises for the exact opposite, i.e. a covert discussion of problems within China, which could hardly be directly addressed in the current political context.**

*"Some Chinese commentators believe that the terror attack in Paris was the result of the interference of the developed countries in Syria, there were even 'they-deserve-it' voices. This kind of argument is ignorant, short-sighted, callous and misleading the public."*²³ (Hu Shuli, editor-in-chief, Caixin News, 23/11/2015)

*"Systemic problems [in China] which people want to cover up may blow up in an unpredictable way. The suffering of other countries should be a mirror of reflection for us."*²⁴ (Caixin, 13/07/2015)

These open controversies make European crises interesting cases for the analysis of Chinese media as the topics are often only indirectly related to politically sensitive issues within China. This allows for a broader spectrum of opinions and more open deviation from the official party-state line:

*"Many European countries [...] have opened their arms to accept refugees coming from far away [...]. It is really hard to understand China's behaviour. We have become used to hearing officials call us a 'responsible great power', but when push comes to shove, we appear hypocritical, egoistic and narrow-minded."*²⁵ (Anonymous blogger, Sina blog, 29/04/2016)

5. Outlook: A Europe in continued “crisis mode” will further feed into the Chinese party-state ambition to denounce the “West”

The official China sees the EU and Europe not at the brink of collapse, but – as a part of “the West” – in a state of decay.

Reporting on European crises provides prominent evidence for the broader propaganda strategy the CCP has embarked on: denouncing “the West” to more assertively promote distinctively “Chinese” concepts and allow China to take the moral high ground – both internally and globally.²⁶ However, there is no coherent “Chinese view” on Europe: Many analyses of the European crises articulated in market-oriented as well as social media differ from, and sometimes even challenge, the official party-line. As Europe-related topics do not seem to be subject to heavy censorship, market-oriented and social media cater to the needs of an increasing proportion of the urban Chinese middle class who demand more nuanced assessments of the situation in foreign countries as they travel, do business, or send their children abroad for studies.

For the EU and its member states, the results of the analysis have far-reaching consequences:

■ The continued prevalence of internal crises in Europe has significant implications for international power relations: Chinese party-state media are aptly using the apparent cracks in Europe’s political order to gain the moral high ground and argue for the superiority of distinctly Chinese approaches. The more blatantly Europe presents an image of disunity and instability, the easier it is for Chinese political elites to use this in an ideological campaign against supposedly “Western” norms and values.

■ The Chinese leadership is likely to strengthen its efforts to promote “Chinese” concepts as alternative normative ethics and political principles in the international arena. If Europe cannot successfully cope with the growing alienation of its people from established democratic institutions and right-wing forces further gain in strength and visibility, the idea of flawed “Western values” and the need for alternative concepts present in all party-state media is also likely to gain traction internationally. Beijing could then easily win over crucial support from Western scholars, diplomats and entrepreneurs who are disappointed and disillusioned with political procedures and institutions in their respective home countries and/or in Europe.

■ By contrast, the media analysis also confirmed China’s continued interest in political stability in Europe. This might, however, change in the future if nationalistic currents grow stronger in China or if Sino-EU relations become tenser. Chinese domestic media discourse is a much better early indicator of such potential changes in attitudes towards Europe than official diplomatic statements and thus needs to be closely monitored.

■ The persisting goodwill and genuine interest in Europe in non-official Chinese media indicates important potential for productive engagement. By communicating and engaging directly and actively with influential market-oriented media and key opinion leaders in China, European countries can communicate an authentic and honest assessment of their failures and challenges to an interested Chinese audience.

- 1 | For instance, an EU-commissioned study on perceptions of the EU abroad in 2015 found that "The EU was among the most positively viewed countries and international organisations in China." (Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (2015): Analysis of the perception of the EU and of EU's policies abroad. China country fiche, p.1, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/showcases/eu_perceptions_study_en.htm)
- 2 | <http://wap.huanqiu.com/r/MV8wXzkwNzUxMTdfMTI0F8xNDY2NjY-zNTgw>
- 3 | <http://shihb.blog.sohu.com/322193189.html>
- 4 | See, for example, Polyakova, Alina: "Putinism and the European Far Right", Institute of Modern Russia, 19 January 2016, <http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/world/2500-putinism-and-the-european-far-right>.
- 5 | http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-04/26/c_128930261.htm
- 6 | http://bjrb.bjd.com.cn/html/2015-10/14/content_318135.htm
- 7 | Our analysis of main and secondary topics shows that 70% of Chinese articles on terrorism in Europe and 88% of articles on right-wing extremism link these crises to the refugee crisis. Coding in the detailed content analysis was designed to identify the 'main' and potentially 'secondary' crises addressed in each article.
- 8 | All 75,000 articles were automatically coded by predominant tonality using the media analysis tool Meltwater. "Negative" indicates that the article either directly or indirectly communicates a negative feeling to the reader.
- 9 | See for example Zhang, Taisu: "China's Coming Ideological Wars", Foreign Policy, 1 March 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/01/chinas-coming-ideological-wars-new-left-confucius-mao-xi> or "Unravelling China's Campaign against Western values", China Digital Times, March 2015, <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/unraveling-chinas-campaign-western-values/>
- 10 | The Chinese leadership was also well aware of the sensitive nature of the referendum per se – as a democratic tool which might be seized upon by Chinese who advocate, for example, self-determination for Tibet or Xinjiang. Thus the leadership sought to ensure/secure their official story/narrative of this event through related censorship instructions, s. "Minitrue: Don't Hype, Speculate, or Comment on Brexit", China Digital Times, June 2016, <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/06/minitrue-dont-hype-speculate-comment-brexit/>
- 11 | http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-06/26/c_129090622.htm
- 12 | <http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/1007/c1002-27666986.html>
- 13 | http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-04/11/c_128881343.htm
- 14 | <http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/1004/c1002-27661170.html>
- 15 | http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-02/15/c_1118029655.htm
- 16 | http://www.ciis.org.cn/chinese/2015-09/09/content_8222894.htm
- 17 | http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-02/15/c_1118029655.htm
- 18 | http://www.ciis.org.cn/chinese/2015-09/09/content_8222894.htm
- 19 | <http://weekly.caixin.com/2016-01-15/100899614.html>
- 20 | <http://www.infzm.com/content/114335>
- 21 | <http://international.caixin.com/2015-11-14/100874177.html>
- 22 | <http://www.21ccom.net/articles/world/qggc/20150911128828.html>
- 23 | <http://weekly.caixin.com/2015-11-20/100876426.html>
- 24 | <http://weekly.caixin.com/2015-07-10/100828025.html>
- 25 | http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4ef36bd40102wftr.html
- 26 | See for example Sun, Wanning: "Foreign or Chinese? Reconfiguring the Symbolic Space of Chinese Media", Journal of International Communication, 8 (2014), 1894-1911, <http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/download/2583/1175>.

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DESIGN

STOCKMAR+WALTER Kommunikationsdesign

ISSN 2509-3843